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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In this paper we assess the degree to which the current social security
system redistributes income from rich to poor. We then estimatethe
impact of various proposed changes to social security on the overall
redistributive effect of the system. Our analysis takes a steady-state
approach in which we assume participants work their entire lives and
retire under a given system. Redistribution is measured on a lifetime
basis using estimated earnings profiles for a sample of people taken from
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grateful for helpful comments from Gib Metcalf, Ed Olsen, Jim Poterba, and Jon Skinner.
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pressed are those of the authors and not those of the Federal Reserve Board or the National
Bureau of Economic Research.150Coronado, Fullerton, & Glass
the PSID. We allow for differential mortality, not only by gender and
race, but also by lifetime income. Our results indicate that the current
social security system redistributes less than is generally perceived,
mainly because people with higher lifetime income live longer and there-
fore draw benefits longer. Remaining progressivity is reduced and even
reversed by an increase in the assumed discount rate, since regressive
taxes become more important relative to later progressive benefits. We
find that many of the proposed changes to social security have surpris-
ingly little effect on the redistribution inherent in the system.
1. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this paper is to analyze ways in which the current social
security system and some proposed reforms redistribute betwei high-
and low-income groups, defined on a lifetime basis. Rather tF n look at
redistributions between age cohorts, our analysis focuses ex iusively on
intragenerational redistribution in a steady state. We assume that all
working years and retirement years come under a single social security
system. Thus we assess long-run redistributive effects of the current
system and of several reforms. Within this steady-state context, we look
at the system's lifetime redistribution across groups defined by income,
gender, and marital status. We allow for heterogeneity within each in-
come group, as specific features of the social security system differen-
tially affect groups with different proportions of individuals whoare
single or married, are male or female, work continuously or sporadically,
and have different mortality rates.
Our analysis proceeds in five stages. In the first stage,we use 22 years
of wage rates from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to esti-
mate wage-rate profiles for different kinds of individuals (household
heads, full-time working wives, and part-time working wives). The esti-
mated coefficients are used to project each individual'swage rates before
and after the sample period, so that each individual hasa complete wage
profile from age 22 to 66. The wage rate for each year is multiplied bya
total time endowment to calculate potential earnings, and the present
value of this endowment is used to categorize individuals into quintiles
from rich to poor.
In the second stage, for each quintile, actual earnings are used to
estimate earnings profiles. We again use the coefficients to project out-
of-sample earnings for each individual, so that each member ofour
sample has a complete lifetime earnings history. In the third stage,we
derive income-differentiated mortality rates for each group. Then, in the
fourth stage, we use the constructed earnings histories and mortalityDistributional Impacts of Proposed Changes to Social Security151
probabilities to calculate each individual's expected lifetime social secu-
rity taxes and benefits. In the final stage, we add over the individuals in
each quintile to get the net impact of social security on each group. We
also calculate the redistributive effects of four proposed reforms.
Using actual earnings data is one of the important innovations of our
paper. As noted below, previous studies usestylized groups, or
smoothly-estimated profiles for each group. In contrast, the use of actual
earnings data allows us to incorporate differential effects of human capi-
tal investment, illnesses, child rearing, and other events that affect earn-
ings and that may lead individuals to enter and exit the labor force. We
also give special attention to differential mortality rates by gender, race,
and lifetime income.
Distributional effects of the current system also represent the effects of
a major reform, namely, repeal of social security.In addition, we calcu-
late effects of four smaller reforms designed to reduce the current social
security deficit by the same amount: eliminating the provision for drop-
ping certain low-earnings years from the benefit calculation;increasing
the age of retirement; increasing the tax rate; and decreasing benefits.
We find that: (1) overall, the social security system is progressive; (2)
allowing for income-differentiated mortality substantially reduces mea-
sured progressivity; (3) increasing the assumed discount rate can elimi-
nate remaining progressivity; (4) the four reforms we study aresomewhat
regressive; and (5) income-differentiated mortality lessens the regressive
nature of the proposed reforms.
2. OUR APPROACH RELATIVE TO PREVIOUSWORK
To clarify how and why our approach differs from existingliterature,
consider the two illustrative lifetime wage profiles in Figure 1. The
relatively-poor person's wage increases with age through points A, B,
and C, and then falls to point D at retirement. The rich person's profile is
higher (through points E, F, G, and H). In this context, the social security
system may take taxes from both types of persons duringworking years,
and provide benefits to both when retired. We wish to measure how
much of this money is transferred from the high-lifetime-income person
to the low-lifetime-income person, rather than justtransferred from
working years to retirement years within the same group.
Initial tax incidence studies like Pechman and Okner (1974) used
groupings based on annual income. This type of study finds thatthe
social security system is progressive, but it aggregates unlike individu-
als. The richest group includes only those at point G, the next group
includes those at points F and C, the following group includes those at152Coronado, Fullerton, & Glass
Age
FIGURE 1. Two Lifetime Profiles
F, B, and H, and the poorest group includesvery young and old indi-
viduals at points A and D.
Some later studies like Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) include lifetime
profiles and lifetime decisionmaking, in order to find how social security
redistributes between young and old. However, the youngestgroup
aggregates individuals at points A and E, the next group includes B and
F, and the oldest group includes D and H. This type of study also does
not distinguish between the two lifetime income groups in Figure 1.
Although much work has focused on intergenerational effects of the
social security system, considerable work has also looked at intra-
generational redistributionusing arbitrary levels of income for differ-
ent groups. For example, Hurd and Shoven (1985) and Boskin, Kotlikoff,Distributional Impacts of Proposed Changes to Social Security153
Puffert, and Shoven (1987) each use three groups (e.g. median income,
half the median, and five times the median).1 As in Figure 1, the shape of
the earnings profile does not differ between the three groups.
The approach of using arbitrarily-set income levels has tremendous
computational appeal. However, the calculation of social security bene-
fits does not depend just on the level of lifetime earnings. Recent years
often get more weight, and some years with zero earnings canbe
dropped from the calculation. Thus the benefits received by each group
depend on the shape of the earnings profile and the variance from one
year to the next. For these reasons, weestimate a nonlinear profile
separately for each group. We retain actual earnings data from the sam-
ple period and use actual and constructed years of datawith zero earn-
ings. Each group has different proportions of individualswith different
numbers of zero-earnings years that can be dropped from the benefit
calculations (as in Williams, 1998).
Some studies have used actual social security records tolook at issues
of redistribution. Burkhauser and Warlick (1981) and Hurdand Shoven
(1985) use extracts from social security records, while Duggan,Gilling-
ham, and Greenlees (1993) use records for more than 32,000workers
from the Continuous Work History Sample of social securityrecords.
While using social security records would better identify socialsecurity
earnings histories, two important elements are missing fromthe avail-
able extracts. First, the observed amount of earnings is generallycapped
at the annual social security wage cap. Yet only datawith wage rates
above the cap can capture the regressivity of social security taxesthat
exempt higher wages. Second, and equally important,records for indi-
viduals are not linked with records of spouses.
Fullerton and Rogers (1993) also estimate profiles separatelyfor 12
different lifetime income groups, and use them to calculatethe mci-
dences of various taxes, but they do not look at social securitybenefits.
More recently, Altig et al. (1997) employ the same 12 lifetimeincome
groups in their model of tax incidence,and Kotlikoff, Smetters, and
Walliser (1998) do use that model to look at social security. These compu-
tational general equilibrium models can calculate the effects of social
security reforms on factor returns in each period, buteach of the 12
groups is assumed to be homogeneous.Since everyone in a group must
work the average amount for that group these general equilibriummod-
1Panis and Lifiard (1996) set the low group at full-time minimum-wageearnings, the
middle group at the social security average earnings, and the high group atthe social
security tax wage cap. Similar procedures are followed by Myers andSchobel (1983),
Steuerle and Bakija (1994), and Garrett (1995).154Coronado, Fullerton, & Glass
els cannot incorporate heterogeneity such as the fraction in eachgroup
who have zero earnings.
For these reasons, in this paper we do not attempt to builda general
equilibrium model. The point of this paper is to makeuse of actual data
on diverse individuals within each lifetime income group. We can thus
use the fact that each group has a different proportion of individuals
with zero-earnings years, a different proportion who qualify for spousal
benefits, and a different proportion who receive fewer benefits because
they die earlier. In this way, we can look at distributional effects of
specific elements of the social security system.2
The literature on distributional effects of specific elements of the social
security system is small. Flowers and Horowitz (1993) look at the
spousal benefit, whereby low-earner spouses can draw the greater of
their own computed benefit and one-half the higher-earning spouse's
benefit. They demonstrate that the spousal benefit calculation isprogres-
sive compared to an own-benefit calculation. This result is driven by
their finding that higher-income families consist ofspouses with more
equal earnings (lower-income couples have more disparate earnings).
Panis and Lifiard (1996) use a lowmediumhigh income structure to
examine three basic reforms: increasing retirement age, increasingpay-
roll taxes, and decreasing benefits.
A few studies introduce income-differentiated mortality into analysis
of the social security system. Rofman (1993) uses a data set that matches
demographic information from the Current Population Survey withso-
cial security information on earnings, benefits, and mortality. However,
Duleep (1986) reports that mortality information is severely under-
reported in the social security records, especially for working-age indi-
viduals and for minorities. Garrett (1995) uses mortality estimates froma
literature search, and Panis and Lifiard (1996) extract mortality informa-
tion from the PSID. Since high-income people live longer, several stud-
ies show that allowing for income-differentiated mortality seriously
dampens the progressivity of social security (e.g. Steuerle and Bakija,
1994; Duggan, Gillingham, and Greenlees, 1995; and Panis and Lillard,
1996).
Finally, Caldwell et al.(this volume) use CORSIM, a large micro-
simulation model, to construct lifetime earnings for many individuals.
This model starts with the 1960 Census Public-Use Microdata Sample
and uses estimated transition probabilities to grow the sample inone-
2By concentrating on dollar flows, however, we miss the effect of this social insurance
program on the utility of risk-averse individuals The benefits of risk reduction may be
larger for low- or high-income individuals Lee, McClellan, and Skinner (this volume)
calculate such effects for Medicare.Distributional Impacts of Proposed Changes to Social Security155
year intervals. For each person, theysimulate the next year's income
and work status. Thus, as in our study, they capture differences in race,
gender, the number of zero-earnings years, differential mortality,and
wage rates above the cap. They focusprimarily on intergenerational
redistributions, finding that while early generations received a good rate
of return, postwar generations receive smaller and even negative ratesof
return.
3. WAGE PROFILES, QUINTILES, AND
EARNINGS HISTORIES
The data and methodology used to obtain our lifetime wageproffles
and earnings profiles are summarized in the Appendix.3 We usethe
PSID for the years 1968 to 1989, which gives us 22 yearsof actual
earnings data for a sample of the population. Section A.1 discussesthe
selection of our sample, consisting of 1,082 heads and 696 wives. Inthe
PSID, if a household contains a married couple, thehusband is auto-
matically designated as the household head. Thus, most heads in our
sample are male. Of the 386 single heads of household, 118 arefemale
and 268 are male.
In the first stage, we estimate wage profiles in order tocalculate the
present value of potential earnings and to categorizemembers of our
sample into lifetime income quintiles. The goal of this stage is todivide
the heads and wives into lifetime income groups that identify thosewho
are rich or poor, using a broad measureof economic welfare. To include
the value of leisure and the value of home production, we usepotential
earnings rather than actual earnings. We assume that eachindividual
could work a maximum of 80 hours per week (4,000 hours peryear).
Then, in order to avoid the fluctuations of annual income, weclassify
individuals according to lifetime potential earnings. In addition, because
of the difficulties in defining the lifetime of a household, we categorize
people on an individual basis.
In the second stage, to look at the effect of social security, weneed
actual earnings information from ages 22 to 66. For this reason, wethen
use our PSID data to estimate earningsprofiles by quintile and gender,
and we use the coefficients for each individual to construct earningsfor
out-of-sample years.
A full description appears in Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass (1998). That paperdevelops
the model and uses it to evaluate earlier calculations of progressivity of the existingsocial
security system. The current paper does not evaluate earlier calculationsfor the existing
social security system, but instead evaluates proposed reforms.156Coronado, Fullerton, & Glass
3.1 Lifetime Income
We first estimate potential lifetime income. To begin, we divide each
year's earnings by hours worked to calculate the annual wage ratesepa-
rately for each head and wife. We then use this wage rate and multiply it
in each year by 4,000 hours to represent the year's labor endowment.
This product represents the potential earnings of the individual and
therefore serves as a measure of his or her material well-being. Using
this endowment allows us to abstract from the actual laborleisure
choice, since someone who chooses to consume more leisure might be
just as well off as someone who decides to work more andconsume less
leisure. Using potential income also avoids the distortion introduced by
the fact that home production does not show up in the data under hours
worked. The wage rate is a measure of earning power that reflects experi-
ence, talent, and education.
To construct wage rates for every year of our sample members' work-
ing lives, we use the PSID data to estimate log wage profiles. We esti-
mate separate log wage regressions for heads and wives. For the heads
of household we take all positive observations for wages, which givesus
19,130 observations on 1,082 heads. We regress the log of thewage rate
on an individual fixed effect and other variables like age, age squared,
and age cubed. We thus estimate a shape of the wage profile like those in
Figure 1. Because we have a fixed effect for each individual,we cannot
use variables that do not vary over time (like race or gender). However,
we do include age interacted with education, race, and gender. The re-
sults of this regression are shown in Table 1. Using the resulting fixed
effects and coefficients, we then fill in missing observations during the
sample period, and we fill in observations outside the sample period.
Thus, for each household head, we have a wage rate forevery year of
their entire economic life from age 22 to 66.
To capture potential earnings for each wife, we wanta wage rate for
each year whether or not she worked. Non-working wives doengage in
household production, and assigning them a zero wagemay incorrectly
place them in a low lifetime income group. The data indicate that wives
fall into three basic categories: wives who work on a regular basis, wives
who work in only a few of the sample years, and wives who do not work
at all. For those wives who average more than 750 hours of work per
year, we have 5,413 observations on 307 women. For those who work
occasionally, but average less than 750 hours, we have 2,292 observa-
tions on 296 wives. A third group includes 93 wives who do not work at
all throughout the sample.
For each of the two groups of working women, we take all positiveDistributional Impacts of Proposed Changes to Social Security157
TABLE 1




observations and regress the log of the wage rate on an individual fixed
effect and variables for age and the interaction between age and educa-
tion.4 The results of these regressions for the two groups of women can
be found in our previous paper (Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass,1998).
We again use the estimated fixed effects and coefficients to fill in missing
observations within the sample, and to simulate observations outside the
sample, so that each wife has a complete wage profile for ages 22-66. For
the 93 women who did not work at all during the sample, we assign them
the median fixed effect for the women who averaged less than 750 hours
of work annually. We then use the coefficients from that group's log
wage regression to fill in the entire profileof potential hourly wages.
Once we have a complete wage profile for each of our heads and wives




where t indexes the 45 years in the individual's economic lifetime rele-
vant for social security (ages 22 to 66), where the individualcould work a
maximum of 80 hours per week for 50 weeks per year, andwhere P is
the individual's probability of survival to age t. We use two different
values for r, the discount rate.
As couples generally pool their resources, it would be inappropriate to
The PSID does not have a race variable for the wives in the sample.




Age X education 0.003669 4.87
Age2 X education 0.0000326 4.52
Age X female 0.0239 1.89
Age2 X female 0.000306 2.11
Age X white 0.0167 1.32
Age2 X white 0.000240 1.67158Coronado, Fullerton, & Glass
place husbands and wives individually into separate lifetime income
quintiles. Thus the next step is to use a household equivalence scale that
accounts for the average net economies and diseconomies of scale in the
different categories of household consumption. Jorgenson and Slesnick
(1987) find that this adjustment means taking the sum of the couple's
incomes and dividing by 1.934, so the implication is net economies of
scale.5 Most importantly, this use of equivalence scales is designed to
guarantee that a husband and wife are always placed in the same life-
time income quintile, regardless of their separate incomes.
We can now deal with all members of our sample as individuals and
categorize them into five lifetime income groups. The first quintile has
the lowest income, and the fifth has the highest income.
3.2 Earnings Histories
In the first stage described above, we divide individuals into lifetime
income quintiles based on a wage profile and the implied present value
of their labor endowment. Individuals are thus separated into categories
based on what we feel to be an appropriate measure of economic well-
being. Because the costs and benefits of social securityare based on
actual income, however, we also need profiles of actual earnings. In this
stage we estimate earnings regressions instead of wage regressions. For
each quintile, using our data from the PSID, section A.2 describes how
we estimate separate earnings regressions for heads, working wives,
and occasional working wives. In this stage we use both positive and
zero earnings observations. We then use the results of these Tobit regres-
sions to simulate earnings for out-of-sample years, and we constructa
complete profile of "actual" earnings for each individual from ages 22 to
66. Our methodology allows for the simulation of years with zero earn-
ings. We then use these profiles in our analysis of the distributional
effects of social security.
We estimate our earnings regressions using maximum likelthood sepa-
rately by quintile for heads, habitual working wives, and part-time work-
ing wives. We thus estimate a total of 15 regressions (reported in Coro-
nado, Fullerton, and Glass, 1998). For each regression for the heads,we
begin with independent variables for age, age squared, age cubed, educa-
tion, education squared, gender, race, the product of age and education,
the product of age and gender, and the product of age and race. We then
eliminate the variables that are insignificant. For the regressions for
For all of our couples, we use the equivalence scale estimated by Jorgensen and
Slesnick (1987) for an urban household in the northeastern U.S. headed by a white
person aged 35-44.Distributional Impacts of Proposed Changes to Social Security159
wives, we begin by including age, age squared, age cubed, education,
education squared, and the product of age and education. We again
eliminate the variables that were insignificant.
We next use the estimated coefficients from our earnings regressions
to simulate earnings observations for the out-of-sample yearsfor all
individuals in our sample, so that each person has an earnings profile for
ages 22 to 66. Unlike the first stage, we do notalso use these coefficients
to fill in missing or zero earnings observations duringthe sample period.
This is because we are interested in actual earnings, and years spent out
of the labor force are relevant for calculating the costs and benefits of
social security for an individual. In fact, we also calculate a representa-
tive number of zero-earnings years in the simulated out-of-sample por-
tions of each earnings profile.
Combining the actual observations with the simulated observations
for each individual yields a complete earnings profile for ages 22 to 66.
We next proceed to use these profiles to analyze the distributional effect
of social security. The advantage of using these estimated profiles is that
we can allow for entry and exit from the laborforce. These events are
relevant when evaluating the redistributive effect of social security, be-
cause benefits are based on earnings historiesand allow for a certain
number of years to be dropped before making average-wage calcula-
tions.Another advantage of using actual data toanalyze the
redistributive effect of social security is that we have a demographically-
diverse sample. This diversity affects our analysis in that different demo-
graphic groups have different mortality rates. These differences turn out
to be an important issue in analyzing social security, asdescribed below.
4. INCOME-DIFFERENTIATED MORTALITY
Standard mortality tables extend only to age 85 and are differentiated
only by sex and race. As described in section A.3, we extend these data
in three ways. First, we describe assumptions necessary to extendthe
tables to age 99. Second, since individuals with low incomes have higher
mortality rates than the population as a whole, we modify the standard
tables by using available information on mortality differentiated by an-
nual income. Third, we then use that information to construct mortality
tables that are differentiated among our lifetime income quintiles. In later
sections we use these tables to compute expected values ofsocial secu-
rity taxes and benefits.
Standard mortality tables are provided in Vital Statistics of the United
States (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1993).These













FIGURE 2. Number Still Alive as a Function of Age
Source: Vital Statistics of the U.S.-1989, expanded.
up to 85. Some prior studies use a simple procedure in which they com-
pute normal life expectancy at each age and then assume that the individ-
ual will be alive exactly that long and wifi die at the date of lifeexpec-
tancy.6 Instead, we use the probability of remaining alive at eachage.
Based on standard mortality tables, a hypothetical 22-year-old white male
has probabilities of survival to age 23 of 99.83 percent, survival toage 65
of 75.82 percent and survival to age 85 of 22.34 percent. We multiply the
tax that would be due or the benefit that would be received at each age by
the probability of attaining that age, and then calculate the rate of return
on these expected cash flows. Because all outflows (taxes) occur in the early
years and all inflows (benefits) occur in the later years, this method wifi
differ considerably from the simpler procedure just described.
The National Center for Health Statistics obtains death certificates
from all U.S. states and constructs four "current life tables" (for white
males, white females, non-white males, and non-white females).7 For
6 For example, a white male aged 22 hasa life expectancy of 51.1 years and can therefore
expect to attain age 73.1. This simple procedure would determine the amount of taxes paid
and benefits received through age 73.1 and then calculate the rate of return that equates
these present values.
"Thus, for example, a current life table for 1989 assumes a hypothetical cohort subject
throughout its lifetime to the age-specific death rates prevailing for the actual population in
1989. The current life table may thus be characterized as rendering a 'snapshot' of current
mortality experience, and shows the long-range implications of a set of age-specific death
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TABLE 2
Ratio of Observed Deaths to Expected Deaths (OlE) for Each Race-Sex
Group-Ages 25-34
Source: Rogot, Sorlie, Johnson, and Schmitt (1992, Table 7). The "expected" number of deaths is based
on the overall death rate within the age-sex-race category, not differentiated by income,while
"observed" deaths are the actual deaths in each income group.
100,000 individuals alive at age 0, the table shows the number surviving
at each age 1 through 85. Since 31 percent of the population is still alive
at age 85, section A.3 describes how we extend the tables through age
99. These expanded mortality tables allow us to weight tax payments
and benefits by the probability of dying in each year from age 22 to 99.
Figure 2 shows the extended mortality for the four race-sex groups.
Many studies have noted that mortality rates for the poor are larger
than average. A Mortality Study of 1.3 Million Persons (Rogot, Sorlie, John-
son, and Schmitt, 1992) provides a rich source of data onthis effect. We
use their information on observed deaths, 0, and the numberof deaths
that would be expected if all income groups had the same mortality rate,
E, and apply the OlE ratios to each cell in the extended mortality tables.
Results for 25-34-year-olds are shown in Table 2, but we derive similar
tables for each age group.8
Among white males, Table 2 shows that those in the poorest annual-
income group die at a rate that is 168 percent of the average for their age
group, while those in the richest annual-income group die at a ratethat
is only 61 percent of the average for their age. For non-white females, the
poor die at a rate that is 186 percent of the average, while the rich die at a
rate that is 44 percent of the average.
Income-differentiated mortality rates are also employed by Caldwell et al. (this volume)














<5,000 11,670 6.31 1.68 1.51 1.54 1.86
5,000-9,999 22,085 18.25 1.20 0.97 0.81 1.01
10,000-14,999 33,331 36.27 1.28 1.17 1.36 1.01
15,000-19,999 32,231 53.70 1.12 0.76 0.71 0.84
20,000-24,999 30,729 70.31 0.80 0.97 0.92 0.36
25,000-49,999 48,375 96.47 0.73 0.94 0.72 0.44
>49,999 6,529 100.00 0.61 1.15 0.72 0.44
n= n=
Totals 184,950 81,46185,0477,75210,690162Coronado, Fullerton, & Glass
Although we have the annual income of each individual in our sample
for each year, we do not just use the corresponding annual income
group's 0/F ratio from Table 2 for that person in that year. One problem
with doing so is that annual income levels would have to be adjusted for
inflation and growth to match up with the 1980 levels in Table 2. A
second problem is that an individual with a steeply hump-shaped earn-
ings profile (as in Figure 1) would have a probability of dying that fell
dramatically during high-annual-income years and then rose again dur-
ing low-annual-income years. We do not believe that the same individ-
ual's probability of death changes that rapidly with annual income, jump-
ing over other individuals in the same age cohort whose annual incomes
are not so volatile. Instead, the probability of dying is more likely af-
fected by the individual's lifetime income group. To solve both of these
problems, our procedure described in section A.3 is based on the relative
ranking of each individual's lifetime income. A person in a particular
percentile of the lifetime income distribution gets the OlE ratio of a
person in the same percentile of the annual income distribution.9
5. SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES PAID
This section describes how our calculation of social security tax for each
person in each year follows the provisions of the Social Security Adminis-
tration. This tax is commonly referred to as the PICA tax (Federal Insur-
ance Contributions Act). It is collected on earned income and consists of
three portions: Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), Disability Insur-
ance (DI), and Hospitalization Insurance (HI), also known as Medicare.
The proceeds from these taxes are deposited into three separate trust
funds, and benefits are paid from the appropriate fund. The program has
become almost universal-95 percent of all employment in the U.S. is
covered.10
The tax is deducted from employees' pay at a rate of 7.65 percent of
wages, but employers match those deductions for a total tax of 15.3
percent. Self-employed individuals pay the entire 15.3 percent tax annu-
ally with their income tax returns. Both the employee and the employer
Thus, even if two retirees have the same low annual income, the one with higher lifetime
income is assumed to have a lower mortality probability.
10Coverage may be excluded for: federal civilian workers hired before 1984 who have not
elected to be covered; railroad workers who are covered under a similar but separate
program; certain employees of state and local government, covered by their state's retire-
ment programs; household workers and farm workers with certain low annual incomes;
persons with income from self-employment of less than $400 annually; and those who
work in the underground, cash, or barter economy who may illegally escape the tax.Distributional Impacts of Proposed Changes to Social Security163
share of the tax are collected on wages up to an annual maximum
amount of taxable earningsthe social security wage cap ($68,400for
1998). This cap is adjusted automatically each year with the average
earnings level of individuals covered by the system, thereby taking ac-
count of both real wage growth and inflation.
Since an objective of our research is to measure each worker's return on
social security taxes, the question arises: how much of the total tax does
the worker bear? Using only the statutory incidence (the worker'shalf)
would result in much higher returns than using the combined employer
and employee portions. Hamermesh and Rees (1993, p. 212) review em-
pirical work on payroll tax incidence and conclude that the worker bears
most of the employer's share of the tax through reduced wages.We there-
fore base our estimates on the combined employer and employee tax.11
Our focus is the retirement portion of the social security system, not
the disability insurance or hospital insurance. Of the total 15.3 percent
employer and employee tax, 10.6 percent is for OASI, 1.8 percent is for
DI, and 2.7 percent is for HI.12 The OASI portion of the taxis paid
directly to the OASI Trust Fund, which is used to pay all retirement
benefits. We therefore ignore the DI and HI portions of the tax, as well
as benefits paid from the DI and HI TrustFunds.
Table 3 shows the combined OASI tax rate for selected years since
1940, ending with the 10.6-percent rate for 2000 and beyond (asused in
this study). The next two columns show the wage cap and the maximum
possible lax.
In our study, we calculate the present value at age 22 ofmortality-
adjusted social security taxes and benefits through age 99. The probabil-
ity P of the individual being alive at age] is conditional on beingalive at
age 22, and it is computed from theconstructed tables (for each age-
race-sex-income cell) by
number in cell i alive at age j
-number in cell i alive at age 22
11Paths and Lifiard (1996) point out that because the employer's portion of the payroll tax
is deductible against the employer's income tax, the net cost to the employer islower than
the full amount of the payroll tax paid. Like Paths and Lillard, however, and forcomparabil-
ity with other studies, we treat the entire amount of the payroll tax as theemployee's cost
of social security coverage. In effect, we look at the social security system only, without
any income tax. The combined incidence is not equal to the sumof the parts, but we cannot
say whether the income tax affects the incidence ofsocial security, or social security affects
the incidence of the income tax.
12These allocation percentages are for the year 2000 and beyond. Congress "temporarily"
increased the portion going to DI for the years 1994-1996, followed by a reduction for
1997-1999. The 1998 allocation is: OASI 10.7, DI 1.7, and HI 2.9 percent.164Coronado, Fullerton, & Glass
TABLE 3
Old Age and Survivors' Insurance (OASI) Tax Rates and Wage Caps
The tax rate is combined employer and employee portions. Wage ceiling in 2000 assumes constant
inflation of 3% and wage growth of 1%.
Our sample from the PSID includes observed and constructed earn-
ings for each individual from age 22 through the age of retirement. To
obtain steady-state taxes and benefits under current law, however,we
look at a hypothetical future cohort with a birth year of 1990. We
therefore take N0, the observed nominal earnings of individual i inyear
j, and we convert it to the corresponding future-cohort individual's
nominal earnings, Nfl], using the ratio of projected average earnings in




Since 1951, the Social Security Administration has computed Average
Earnings, the average annual earnings of all workers covered under the
Act. We project this Average Earnings into the future, using assump-
tions about future real wage growth and inflation.13 Next, to compute
SST, the social security tax of person i in year j, we take
SST1J = T X min(N11, CAPJ)
where T is the combined OASI tax rate (which is constant withun-
changed law), and CAPJ is the maximum nominal earnings subject to the
13 We use actual inflation and growth to scale observed PSIDyears up to 1995. Since
amounts in simulated future years are indexed, the subsequent inflation and growth rates








1940 2.00 3,000 60
1950 3.00 3,000 90
1960 5.50 4,800 264
1970 7.30 7,800 569
1980 9.04 25,900 2,341
1990 11.20 51,300 5,746
1995 10.52 62,700 6,596
2000 10.60 75,500 8,003Distributional Impacts of Proposed Changes to Social Security165
OASI tax (which increases with inflation). Then the amountthat the
individual expects (at age 22) to pay in year] is
E22(SST11) = SST1 x P1.
That is, the future tax is only paid with the probability P4 that personi is
alive at age ]. These amounts are used below, either tocalculate an
internal rate of return, or to calculate a present value using a particular
discount rate.
6. SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
Under provisions of the Social Security Act, benefits are calculatedfrom
a progressive formula based theindividual's average indexed monthly
earnings (AIME). Our calculations follow the Social Security Adminis-
tration's computation of ATME upon the individual's retirement.In
particular, earnings prior to age 60 are indexed to average wages inthe
year the individual attains age 60. Themethod of indexing is to multi-
ply the nominal earnings in year] by the ratio of Average Earnings in
the year age 60 was attained to Average Earnings in year]. Earnings
after age 60 are not indexed. A person who worked from age 22
through age 64 (retiring on his or her 65th birthday) would have atotal
of 43 years of earnings. Under the Act, only the highest 35 years are
considered, so the lowest eight years of earnings wifi be dropped.
AIME is the simple average of the indexed earnings in those 35 highest-
earnings years.14
Next, the primary insurance amount (PTA) is calculated as 90 percent
of AIME up to the first bend point, plus 32 percent of AIME in excessof
bend point 1 but less than bend point 2, plus 15 percent of AIME in
excess of bend point 2. In 1995, bend point 1 was$426 and bend point 2
was $2,567. If AIME were $3,200, forexample, the PTA would be
PTA = 0.90 X (426) + 0.32 x (2,567 - 426) + 0.15 x (3,200 - 2,567)
= $1,163.47.
Like the cap on earnings, the bend points are adjusted annually by the
proportional increase in Average Earnings. We calculate this PTA for
14 The language of the Act specifies dropping the lowestfive years of earnings through age
61. Then, if the worker has years of earnings after age 61 that are higher than someof the
undropped years of earnings before age 62, the higher post-61 earnings wifi replace the
lower pre-62 earnings. The net effect for a worker retiring at age 65 is to drop the lowest
eight pre-65 years.166Coronado, Fullerton, & Glass
each worker in the sample, which then becomes the basis for all social
security benefit calculations.
A retiree is entitled to a benefit equal to the PTA upon normal retire-
ment at age 65. Legislation already enacted wifi increase the retirement
age by two months each year beginning in 2000, so that by 2005 the
normal retirement age wifi be 66. Another two-month-per-year increase
wifi begin in 2017, resulting in a normal retirementage of 67 after the
year 2021. A worker may stifi choose to retire as early as age 62, with
reduced benefits.15 In contrast, if a worker elects to delay receipt of bene-
fits to an age as late as 70, the eventual benefitsare permanently in-
creased by 5% per year of delay.16 Our calculations below ignore these
provisions for early or late retirement, as we assume workers (and their
spouses) always choose the normal retirement age.17
In addition to retirement benefits for covered workers, the OASI Trust
Fund provides certain benefits to the spouse and other dependents of
retired or deceased workers. Tnt the aggregate, the non-spousal survivor
benefits are relatively minor.18 We take account of payments toa surviv-
ing spouse, but we ignore the non-spousal survivors benefits and there-
fore slightly understate the rates of return.
The spouse of a retired worker can receive the benefit basedon his or
her own earnings, or one-half of the PTA of the retired worker (desig-
nated as the "spousal benefit"), whichever is greater. Theage at which a
spouse may receive the full spousal benefit is the same normal retire-
ment age as for a retired worker. The spouse may elect to receive the
benefit as early as age 60, provided that the workingspouse has re-
tired.19 No premium is provided for delaying the spousal benefit, butwe
15This early-retirement penalty is a permanent reduction in the PIA of percent for each
early month (6.67 percent for each early year). For example, a worker retiring atage 62
when the normal retirement age is 65 would receivea benefit for the rest of his or her life
that is reduced by 20 percent.
16 Under the Act, the 5-percent-per-year premium is scheduledto increase gradually to 8
percent per year for workers reaching age 65 in 2008. The increase applies only for delayed
retirement up to age 70. Beyond age 70, no further incentive is provided to delay benefits.
17 This assumption does not affect progressivityunless the chosen date of retirement
differs by income. If low-income individuals tend to die earlier, then they might optimally
retire earlier, so the availability of this option might be progressive.
1In 1996, a total of $302.9 billion in benefits were paid from the OASI trust fund. Of that
total, $288.1 bfflion was paid as retirement benefits to retired workersor their spouses, and
only $14.8 billion (4.9 percent) was paid for other survivor and miscellaneous benefits
(Annual Statistical Supplement-1997, Table 4A.5 in U.S. Social Security Administration,
1998).
19 However, the penalty for receiving the spousal benefitis somewhat higher than the
worker's penalty:percent for each of the first 36 months (8.33 percent per year) beforeDistributional Impacts of Proposed Changes to Social Security167
always assume normal retirement age anyway. Then, oncespousal bene-
fits have begun, cost of living adjustments for the spousalbenefit are
handled in the same manner as for the worker's benefit.
The spouse of a deceased worker can receive the benefitbased on his or
her own earnings, or 100% of the benefit to which theretired worker was
entitled, whichever is greater. The benefit based onthe deceased
worker's benefit is called the survivor benefit.
Our calculations of these amounts are detailed in sectionA.4. Our
PSID sample provides a complete history of observed andconstructed
earnings for each individual in the sample for ages 22through 66. They
then retire when they turn 67, the normal retirement age under current
law for that future cohort of individuals. We use those earnings to com-
pute indexed earnings, the AIME, the PTA,the spousal benefit (SpBen),
and the survivor benefit for the surviving spouse (SurvBen) in exact
accordance with provisions of the Act.
7. RESULTS FOR THE CURRENTSOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM
We use procedures described above to calculate themortality-adjusted
tax and benefit in each year for each individualin each of our lifetime
income quintiles. Then we use three different measures to gaugethe
distributional effect of the social security system (and later, proposed
reforms). First, for each simulation, we compute the presentvalue, at
age 22, of the benefits to be receivedminus the taxes paid. We then sum
over the individuals in eachlifetime income quintile. This measure indi-
cates the absolute size of the social securitytransfers between income
groups. The discount rate shouldreflect a real rate of return that would
be available to participants in the system, and thatwould provide for the
same certainty as does the SocialSecurity System. The Trustees of the
Social Security System currently use a rate of 2.8 percentfor their long-
term estimate of real returns.20 Ibbotson Associates(1998) reports on
historic rates of return for various portfolio investments.For the period
1935 to 1997, the average inflation rate was 4.0 percent,and the nominal
normal retirement age, pluspercent (5 percent per year) for each of up to 24 additional
months before normal retirement age. A 62 year-old wife of a retired workerwould be
entitled to a spousal benefit equal to 75 percent of the normal 50 percentof the retired
worker's PIA.
20 In arriving at that rate, they forecast inflation at a long-term rate of 3.5 percent, and a
nominal interest rate of 6.3 percent on the special-issue U.S. Treasury obligationsthat are
purchased by the OASI trust fund. Whether to use a before-tax or an after-tax discount rate
depends on one's assumption about what alternative retirement investments areavailable.168Coronado, Fullerton, & Glass
return on intermediate-term U.S. Treasury obligationswas 5.4 percent,
so the real rate of return was 1.4 percent.21
For one choice of discount rate weuse 2 percent, which lies between
the forecast rate earned by the OASI trust fundon its investments (2.8
percent) and the historical average of real returnson government bonds
reported by Ibbotson (1.4 percent). To test the sensitivity of results,we
also use a discount rate of 4 percent. As shown below, the choice ofrate
affects not only the absolute size of the present-value gainsor loss for
each group but also the pattern of progressivity.
Second, we also express the present value of net benefitsas a percent-
age of the present value at age 22 of the lifetime endowment (discounted
at the same rate). This scaling reveals the relative progressivity of the
system. If the same absolute net benefit is provided to all individuals,
that benefit wifi constitute a higher percentage of lifetimeincome in the
lowest quintile. Such a system would typically be calledprogressive.
Third, we ignore the chosen discount rate, andwe calculate the inter-
nal rate of return (IRR) that equates the present value of benefits with the
present value of taxes. The IRR has become an almost universal tool for
measurement of social security taxes and benefits, and we include it for
comparability with other studies.
Our initial simulations use the enacted provisions of the Social Secu-
rity Act, applied to a future cohort born in 1990. Results without income-
differentiated mortality are presented in Table 4. For each quintile,this
table shows the average undiscounted taxes paid and benefitsreceived,
as well as the present value of net benefits, and the internal rates of
return from the streams of taxes and benefits. These results could be
viewed as the distributional impact of an extreme reformrepeal of the
whole social security system.
The reason for showing undiscounted taxes and benefits isto shed
some light on the overall solvency of the social security system. Our
model cannot project actual inflows and outflows, sincewe do not use
demographic forecasts, but a conceptual pointcan be made about sol-
vency in a world with unchanging demographics: with a constant num-
21The nominal return on long-term Treasury obligations was actually lower, 5.3percent,
for a real return of 1.3 percent. Investing in U.S. Treasury Bills, whichare the benchmark
for risk-free investments, yielded a nominal return of 4.0 percent, anda real return of 0
percent.
22Other studies of social security redistribution have used rateson either side of 2 percent.
Myers and Schobel (1983) use 2 percent, Hurd and Shoven (1985)use 3 percent, Boskin,
Kotlikoff, Puffert, and Shoven (1987) use 3 percent, Duggan, Gillingham, and Greenlees
(1993) use 1.2 percent, Steuerle and Bakija (1994)use 2 percent, and Gramlich (1996) uses
2.3 percent. In contrast, Caldwell et al. (this volume) use 3, 5,or 7 percent.Distributional Impacts of Proposed Changes to Social Security169
TABLE 4
Lifetime Taxes and Benefits in the Base Case for the Average Person in
Each Group
(without Income-Differentiated Mortality)
Quintile 1 is the lowest lifetime income group. Columns 2 and 3 are undiscounted lifetime taxespaid and
benefits received (1995 $). Column 4 is the present value at age 22 of benefits less taxes, discounted at2%
and 4%. Column 5 is the internal rate of return from the net benefits received.
ber of entering 22-year-olds in each of the sex-race-income cells in our
model, the undiscounted sum of taxes paid for an individual ($102,700)
equals the sum of taxes paid by all ages alive at one time. Similarlythe
undiscounted sum of benefits ($161,600) is the sum of benefits paid out
to all ages alive at one time. On this basis,the pay-as-you-go social
security system loses the difference ($58,900 per 22-year-old) each year.
Table 4 shows the progressivity of the current social security system.
Individuals in the lowest lifetime income quintile pay lifetime taxes of
$64,700 and can expect to receive lifetime benefits of $125,700.Those
benefits come later in life, however, so the present value at age 22 is a
net loss of $1,300 (using the 2-percent discount rate).This net loss is 0.17
percent of their discounted lifetime endowment. In contrast,the highest
income group pays taxes of $141,400 and receives benefits of $187,000,
but discounting net benefits at 2 percent to age 22 results in a present-
23If we multiply this $58,900 figure by the number of 22-year-olds alive in 1994 (about 3.7
million), we get a total loss of about $220 billion per year. This figure lies betweenthe
"low" and the "high" deficit projected by the Board of Trustees of the Social Security
System (U.S. Social Security Administration, 1998). When converted into 1995dollars,
their "intermediate" projected deficit for 2075 is $480 billion, but thatincludes DI and



















2% 4% 2% 4% Quintile($ thousands)($ thousands) (%)
(1) (2) (3) Discount Discount (5)Discount Discount
1 64.7 125.7 -1.3-16.71.92-0.17-3.10
2 85.4 151.8 -5.8-22.71.69-0.53-2.94
3 106.0 168.7 -13.8-30.41.37-1.05-3.26
4 115.8 174.8 -17.8-33.61.23-1.13-3.00
5 141.4 187.0 -30.1-43.30.85-1.33-2.70
All 102.7 161.6 -13.8-29.4 1.35-0.98-2.96170Coronado, Fullerton, & Glass
value loss of $30,100, which represents 1.33 percent of the present value
of their lifetime income.
The internal IRR is 1.92 percent for the lowest incomegroup and 0.85
percent for the highest income group.24 Viewing these results,one might
say that the social security system is highly progressive. Unfortunately,
however, the IRR can be very sensitive to small changes inparameter
values. Moreover, the tax-incidence literature usually defines progressiv-
ity by an average tax rate that rises with income. Inour model, the life-
time average tax rate is the present value of net tax divided by thepresent
value of income. This ratio increases from 0.17 percent for the lowest
income group to 1.33 percent for the highest incomegroup. By the usual
definition, then, the social security system is progressive.
When the discount rate is raised to 4 percent, the taxes in working
years become even larger relative to the benefits received in retirement
years. The present-value net loss rises from $1,300 to $16,700 for the
lowest income quintile and from $30,100 to $43,300 for the highest
quintile. These losses are all now close to 3 percent of the present value
of lifetime endowment.25
What differences do we anticipate with the introduction of income-
differentiated mortality? Since individuals with low lifetime incomes
have shorter than average life spans, they wifi receive benefits fora
shorter period. Thus we expect less progressivity. Results with income-
differentiated mortality are shown in Table 5. Fora rough measure of
progressivity, consider the difference between the two groups' net tax
rates. In the non-differentiated results of Table 4, the net tax ratewas
0.17 percent for the lowest quintile and 1.33 percent for the highest
quintile, for a difference of 1.16 percent. In the income-differentiated
results of Table 5, these numbers are 0.60 and 1.01 percent, fora differ-
ence of only 0.41 percent.26 Since the measure of progressivity falls from
1.16 to 0.41, we conclude that the consideration of income-differentiated
mortality has reduced the progressivity of the social security system by
more than half.
24 Caidwell etal. (this volume) also find that the IRR falls from theirlowest to their highest
lifetime-labor-earnings group.
These results are consistent with those of Caidwell et al. (this volume). Becausewe
divide the net tax by the present value of potential earnings for 4,000 hoursper year, our
net tax rates are lower than those they get when they divide the net tax by the present
value of actual earnings.
At the same 2-percent discount rate but without income-differentiated mortality, in
Table 4, the ratio of net tax to lifetime income rises monotonically with income. When
income-differentiated mortality is introduced in Table 5, the ratio is hump-shaped. It rises
from the lowest to the middle group and then falls for the highest twogroups.TABLE 5






























Quintile 1 is the lowest lifetime income group. Columns 2 and 3 are undiscounted lifetime taxespaid and
benefits received (1995 $). Colunm 4 is the present value at age 22 of benefits less taxes,discounted at 2%
and 4%. Column 5 is the internal rate of return from the net benefits received.
An increase in the discount rate cuts progressivity by moreand can
even make the overall social security systemregressive. In the last col-
unm of Table 5, with 4 percentdiscount rate, the net tax rate on the
lowest-income quintile (3.31 percent) is higher than onthe top-earning
quintile (2.55 percent). In general, a higher discount rate reducesthe
present value of progressive benefits received duringlater retirement
years by more than it reduces the presentvalue of regressive taxes paid
during earlier working years.
8. PROPOSED REFORMS TO THE SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM
A large number of recent articles on social security reform havedealt
with privatization of the system or other large-scale overhauls(e.g.
Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser, 1998). If complete privatization were
to provide actuarially-fair returns, with noredistributions between indi-
viduals, then the effects of complete privatization in our model are ex-
actly the reverse of having the current social security system (inTables 4
and 5).
However, political considerations may preclude radicalreforms. Be-

































All 103.1 165.5 -12.8-29.1 1.40-0.91-2.92172Coronado, Fullerton, & Glass
cause of the currently-projected deficits in the long run, realistic reforms
might just require one or more changes to raise taxesor reduce benefits
within the context of the current system. We therefore consider piece-
meal reforms like increasing the retirement age, changing themanner in
which the benefit is computed, increasing the payroll tax,or decreasing
the overall level of benefits. All of these reformswere considered by the
1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social Security (1997).27
8.1 Elimination of the Drop-Years Provision
As discussed above, a worker's AIME is computed by adjusting each
year's earnings for inflation and real wage growth, and then dropping
the lowest five years of pre-age-62 indexed earnings. In addition, if the
individual works beyond that age, non-indexed earnings for those addi-
tional years may be substituted for any lower year's earnings. Thus, fora
worker retiring at age 65, a total of eight low-earningsyears may be
dropped. By 2020, when the normal retirementage is 67, a total of ten
years may be dropped.
The effect of the "drop" provision is to increase AIME and thereforeto
increase benefits most for individuals who have high variability in their
lifetime earnings pattern. For example, supposeone individual had level
earnings for all working years, while another had thesame earnings
each year except for ten years with no earnings. The first individualpays
substantially more social security tax but receives thesame benefit as the
second individual who took ten years off.
Steuerle and Bakija (1994) assume that higher-earning individuals
have higher earnings variation than do lower-earnings individuals, and
they point out that this drop-years provision is not likely to beprogres-
sive.28 Williams (1998) has similar findings. The model in thispaper can
be used to evaluate this point about the progressivity of the drop-years
provision.
Our first simulated reform is to delete the drop-years provision, which
The Advisory Council issued a list of consensus recommendations and threenon-
consensus sets of other recommendations. Consensus recommendations included two of
our proposed reformsincrease the period over which wages are averaged in the benefit
formula and increase the normal retirement age beyond 67. Two of the threenon-
consensus groups proposed various types of benefit reductions (another of our reforms),
while one of the groups proposed increasing the payroll tax (our final reform).
"The [dropout-years provision] is hardly progressive. Among its beneficiariesare those
who delay entrance into the full time labor force to attend college and graduateor profes-
sional school. ... Dropout years especially tend to discriminate against those lower-wage
workers who enter the labor force at a younger age and stay in the labor force throughout
most of their adult lives" (Steuerle and Bakija, 1994, p.185).Distributional Impacts of Proposed Changes to Social Security173
TABLE 6
Deleting the Drop-Years Provision: Changesfrom the Base-Case
Simulation
Without income-differentiated With income-differentiated
mortality mortality
(2) (5)
divided Change in divided Change in
Present valueby internalPresent valueby internal
of change inlifetimerate ofof change inlifetimerate of
benefitsincomereturn net benefitsincomereturn net
Quintile 1 is the lowest lifetime income group. Columns 2 and 5 arethe changes in the present value
at age 22 of benefits minus taxes paid, discounted at2%. Columns 3 and 6 equal columns 2 and 5
divided by the present value at age 22 of lifetime income discounted at 2%.Columns 4 and 7 are the
changes in the internal rates of return of social security taxes andbenefits.
means that all earnings for ages22 through 66 are included in the AIME
computation. This reform reduces everyindividual's net benefit and
internal rate of return. Results for our five lifetime income groups are
shown in Table 6. Without income-differentiatedmortality, in the left-
hand side of Table 6, the absolute decline in netbenefits is fairly flat
across these groups, falling by$5,700 in both the lowest income group
and the highest income group. In relative terms,however, the effect is
fairly regressive. The same $5,700 decline in netbenefits represents 0.75
percent of lifetime income for the lowestquintile and only 0.25 percent
of lifetime income for the highest quintile (aregressive spread of 0.50
percent). We also examine results by marital statusand gender, finding
the same pattern throughout: the elimination ofthe drop-years provi-
sion is somewhat regressive (across incomegroups) for all demographic
categories.
With income-differentiated mortality, in theright-hand side of Table
6, this reform appears slightly less regressive.The lowest quintile has a
decrease in net benefits equal to 0.68 percent oflifetime income, while
the highest quintile has a decrease of 0.29 percent (aregressive spread of
only 0.39 percent).






























-5.4Quintile 1 is the lowest lifetime income group. Column 2 is thepercentage decline in AIME, and
column 3 is the percentage decline in undiscourted lifetime benefits thatresult from eliminating the
drop-years provision.
Table 7 shows the change in AIME and the changein lifetime benefits
for each quintile. Eliminating the drop-yearsprovision causes a reduc-
tion in the AIME calculation for low-income individualsof 19.8 percent
and a reduction for the highest incomegroup of 17.7 percent. Thus,
variability of earnings is not materially different. Since thebenefit for-
mula is progressive, however, the reduction inAIME for high-income
individuals generates a lower percentage decrease in theirbenefits than
for lower quintiles. Thus, approximately equalproportional reductions
in AIME result in a larger percentage cut in benefitsfor low-income
workers than for high-income workers.
8.2 Increase in Retirement Age
The adoption of age 65 as the normal retirementage for social security
can be traced to nineteenth-century Germany. Steuerle and Bakija (1994)
report that when the first German universal retirement systemwas intro-
duced, Bismarck apparently chosean age beyond which few survived.
Since the Social Security Act was passed in 1936, theaverage life expec-
tancy has increased by almost four years, and the Social SecurityAdmin-
istration expects the trend to continue into thenext century. A male who
was 65 in 1936 could expect to live to age 76.6 (11.6 years beyond age-65
retirement), whereas his counterpart in 2026can expect to live to 81.6
(16.6 years of retirement).29
If medical technology tends to increase the quality of lifeas well as the length of life
expectancy, then it might be natural to suppose that peoplecan work to older ages as well
as live to older ages.
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TABLE 7
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Already-enacted amendments to the Social Security Actwill gradually
increase the normal retirement age to 67 by the year2020.30 We now
analyze a reform that would further increase the retirement agebeyond
the scheduled increase to age 67thereby increasingthe duration of tax
collections and decreasing the duration of benefits.
How much to increase the retirement age? We want toanalyze and
compare the distributional effectsof reforms that have the same overall
impact on social security. Each reform mayreduce benefits or raise
taxes, or both, so we standardize allreforms to have the same net impact
on the social securityshortfall as the elimination of the drop-years provi-
sion. As shown above, the annual netshortfall is the sum of
undiscounted benefits (paid out to all ages alive at onetime) minus
undiscounted taxes (received from all ages alive at onetime). In Table 4,
the current system's shortfall is $58,900 per22-year-old. As it turns out,
the elimination of the drop-years provisionreduces the average
undiscounted net benefits from $58,900 to $43,400. We then usethat net
revenue gain ($15,500) as our targetfor the other reforms.31 To achieve
this target through a change only to the retirement age, weincrease the
retirement age from 67 to 68.4 years.32
We further assume that individuals will continue towork until normal
retirement age, even when the normal retirement ageis increased. Since
the number of years in the work force isincreased and the expected
number of years of drawing benefits is reduced,this reform results in
higher taxes and lower benefitsa reduction in netbenefits and in the
internal rates of return for all workers.
Table 8 shows that the present value of netbenefits falls more for
high-income groups. The 1.4 years of additionalwork and delay of bene-
fits hits the higher income groups harder inabsolute terms. When we
divide the decline in net benefits by the income ofeach group, however,
the distributional results are shown to beregressive. To explain this
30Workers will stifi be able to retire as early as age 62, butwith a larger penalty. While a
current age-62 retiree receives 80 percent of thefull benefit, the eventual age-62 retiree
receives only 70 percent.
31Again, our measure of revenue is somewhat stylized, since wedo not have detailed
demographic projections. It is the real revenue that would be collectedin any one year of
the future steady-state growth path with unchangingdemographics, summing over all
income groups and ages alive in that year.
32The same target can be achieved by a 15.1-percent increasein the tax rate or by a 9.6-
percent decrease in all benefits. With income-differentiatedmortality, the current system's
shortfall was $62,300 (per 22-year-old). Eliminating the drop-yearsprovision reduced that
shortfall to $46,600, so the net revenue target in that case is$15,700. This target is also met
by an increase in the retirement age from 67 to 68.4,by a 15.3-percent increase in the tax
rate, or by a 9.5-percent decrease in all benefits.176Coronado, Fullerton, & Glass
TABLE 8
Increasing the Normal Retirement Age from 67 to 68.4:
Changes from the Base-Case Simulation
Without income-differentiated With income-differentiated
mortality mortality
(2) (5)
dividedChange in dividedChange in
Present valueby internalPresent valueby internal
of change inlifetimerate ofof change inlifetimerate of
net benefitsincomereturn net benefitsincomereturn
Quintlle 1 is the lowest lifetime income group. Columns 2 and 5are the changes in the present value
at age 22 of benefits minus taxes paid, discounted at 2%. Columns 3 and 6 equal columns 2 and5
divided by the present value at age 22 of lifetime income discounted at 2%. Columns4 and 7 are the
changes in the internal rates of return of social security taxes and benefits.
overall regressive result, note that individualspay the regressive tax for
a longer period and receive the progressive benefit formula fora shorter
period.
Comparing the left-hand and right-hand sides of the table showsthat
consideration of income-differentiated mortality reduces somewhatthe
regressive nature of this reform.
8.3 Increase in the Social Security Tax Rate
Prior to 1990, the social security tax ratewas increased frequently-a
total of 20 times from the inception of thesystem. Some of these in-
creases are shown in Table 3. Amendments to the Act in 1983 provided
for a constant total tax rate of 15.3 percent from 1990onward, and Con-
gress appears very reluctant to increase the tax beyond that level. None-
theless, the target reduction in the social security shortfallcould be
achieved by a simple increase in the rate of tax.
To raise net revenue by the same amountas the first two reforms, the
OASI portion of the payroll tax must be increased by 15.1percent (from
10.6 to 12.2 percent). This reform leaves benefits unchanged.
As shown in Table 9, this reform imposes higher additionaltax on
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TABLE 9
Increasing the Tax Rate by 15.3%: Changes from the Base-Case
Simulation
Without income-differentiated With income-differentiated
mortality mortality
(2) (5)
divided Change in divided Change in
Present valueby internalPresent valueby internal
of change inlifetimerate ofof change inlifetimerate of
net benefitsincomereturn net benefitsincomereturn
Quintile($ thousands) (%) (%) ($ thousands) (%) (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Quintile 1 is the lowest lifetime income group. Columns 2 and 5 are the changes in the present values
at age 22 of benefits minus taxes paid, discounted at 2%. Columns 3 and 6equal columns 2 and 5
divided by the present value at age 22 of the lifetime income discounted at 2%. Columns 4 and 7 are
the changes in the internal rates of return of social security taxes and benefits.
change is somewhat regressive. Note that social security always com-
bines a regressive payroll tax and a progressive benefit formula. The net
effect could go either way. In this reform, all individuals pay moreof the
regressive tax with no change in benefits, so the net effect is regressive.
With income-differentiated mortality, the right-hand side of Table 9
shows that this reform is about equally regressive. Mortality assump-
tions matter less for this reform because taxes are paidearlier in life
when mortality rates are smaller.
8.4 Decrease in the Overall Benefit Level
The social security benefit formula is progressive: 90 percent of AIME up
to bend point 1, 32 percent of AIME between bend points1 and 2, and 15
percent of AIME, if any, beyond bend point 2. Theserules for social
security benefits were amended frequently prior to the 1977amend-
ments. Since 1977, the only increases in benefits haveresulted from
automatic inflation and real-wage-growth increases in the bend pointsof
the benefit formula. Nevertheless, one approach to cutting theshortfall
in the social security system is to decrease the overalllevel of benefits.
If every annual benefit were reduced by 9.6 percent, then theannual
revenue shortfall would be reduced by the same amount asin the first
1 -6.6 -0.87-0.41 -6.6 -0.88-0.40
2 -8.7 -0.80-0.41 -8.7 -0.80-0.42
3 -10.8 -0.82-0.41 -10.9 -0.83-0.42
4 -11.7 -0.74-0.42 -11.9 -0.75-0.43
5 -14.1 -0.62-0.43 -14.6 -0.63-0.42
All -10.3 -0.73-0.42 -10.6 -0.75-0.42178Coronado, Fullerton, & Glass
TABLE 10
Decreasing the Benefit Level by 9.5%: Changes from the Base-Case
Simulation
Without income-differentiated With income-differentiated
mortality mortality
(5)
divided Change in divided Change in
Present valueby internalPresent valueby internal
of change inlifetimerate ofof change inlifetimerate of









Quintile 1 is the lowest lifetime income group. Columns 2 and 5 are the changes in the present values
at age 22 of benefits minus taxes paid, discounted at 2%. Columns 3 and 6 equal columns 2 and 5
divided by the present value at age 22 of the lifetime income discounted at 2%. Columns 4 and 7are
the changes in the internal rates of return of social security taxes and benefits.
three reforms. Table 10 shows that this reform would provide the low-
income quintile with the smallest cut in the dollar amount of net benefits
received. In relation to income, however, the change is regressive. An
individual in the lowest lifetime income group givesup net benefits
equal to 0.54 percent of lifetime income, while one in the highestgroup
gives up only 0.27 percent of lifetime income. The regressive nature of
this change is inherent, since the regressive tax is unchanged while the
progressive benefit formula is reduced. With income-differentiatedmor-
tality, however, the change is not as regressive.
9. CONCLUSION
Social security redistributes not only from young to old, but from rich to
poor. The amount of that latter redistribution is the subject of this paper.
We look at a large sample of individuals from the PSID, estimate their
lifetime potential earnings, and categorize them into quintiles. We also
use observed actual earnings in the sample years and construct earnings
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These histories are used to calculate social security taxesin each working
year and benefits in eachretired year.
Standard mortality tables stop at age 85, and they are notdifferenti-
ated by income. In this paper, we extend mortalitytables to 99 years of
age, and we use evidence onmortality differences by annual income
groups to develop tables thatdiffer among our lifetime income groups.
Without income-differentiated mortality, the social security systemis
fairly progressive across our five lifetime income categories.With our
income-differentiated mortality tables, however, a major portionof the
progressivity of the social security system disappears.Remaining prog-
ressivity can be reduced or reversed by an increase in thediscount rate.
Finally, we analyze four reforms that would raise the same amountof
revenue. Since social security taxes areregressive and benefits are progres-
sive, however, any across-the-board increase in tax ordecrease in benefits
is a regressive change. The consideration of income-differentiatedmortal-
ity somewhat reduces the regressivity of the reforms.
APPENDIX: DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This appendix is divided into four parts, describing theselection of the
sample from the PSID, the estimation of earnings profiles,the derivation
of income-differentiated mortality, and the calculationof social security
benefits.
A.1 Data
We select our sample from the PSID based on threecriteria. First, our
sample members are not taken from the low-incomesubsample of the
PSID. While the data contain weights so that the low-incomesample can
be merged with the representative sample, we felt thatthe representa-
tive sample provided sufficient data for our purposes.Second, we re-
quire that sample members remain in the sample for theentire period.
Survey respondents may have died, or simply decidedthat the survey
was no longer worth their time.Including those who dropped out of the
sample was judged not to be worth the possible distortionin the data
and additional computational work required to track theseindividuals.
Third, we require that sample members do not changemarital status
during the sample period. It is difficult to incorporatechanges in marital
status in an analysis of lifetime incomes.We thus decided to include
only those individuals whose status did not change, despitethe biased
sample selection this implies.
As our analysis is intended to reflect a steady state, weabstract from
real economic growth that occurred during our sampleperiod. We want180Coronado, Fullerton, & Glass
to isolate life-cycle movements in wages so that ourwage profiles are not
specific to one generation during a particular time frame. Adjustingfor
economic growth and inflation yields lifetimewage profiles that can be
used to analyze the distributional impact of social security ina more
general, structural sense. We therefore adjust the nominalwage rate
using the Social Security Administration's Average Wage Index,which
reflects growth in average nominal wagesover the sample period. Using
this index to deflate wages thus removes the effects of both inflationand
real growth in wages.
We want to estimate a wage regression for the workingwives as we
do for the heads, but we question the idea of pooling thepositive
observations of the wives who work consistently throughout thesam-
ple with those who work only occasionally. We found thata woman
would have to work at least 750 hoursa year throughout her working
life, an amount slightly less than half time, to have herown social
security benefits be greater than the spousal benefits she couldreceive
based on her husband's earnings (assuming sheearns the same wage as
her husband). Thus, we divide the working wivesinto two groups
based on whether or not they averaged at least 750 hours ofwork per
year throughout the sample. We ran our log wage regressionssepa-
rately for the two groups, and thenran another one pooling the two
groups, in order to perform an F test. The results suggest that these two
groups should indeed be analyzed separately. These regressionsare
described in the text.
A.2 The Estimation of Earnings Profiles
For each of our lifetime income quintiles,we estimate separate earnings
regressions for heads, habitual working wives, and part-time working
wives. Our dependent variable is actual annual earnings. As in thefirst
stage, we deflate earnings by the Social Security Administration'sAver-
age Wage Index to adjust for both inflation and real economic growth.
Since earnings represent a continuous variable truncatedat zero, we use
a tobit framework for estimation. Here we assume that earnings is the
product of optimal hours of work anda wage rate that is exogenous to
the individual. Optimal hours of workcan be positive or negative, so
optimal earnings can be described as a latent variable y*:
y=X1f3+
where X is a vector of personal characteristics that determine theindivid-
ual's wage and desired hours of work. Weassume that observations of
zero hours worked imply that desired hours of work are less thanorDistributional Impacts of Proposed Changes to Social Security181
equal to zero. Actual earnings, y, are observed onlyif y is greater than
zero. If y is less than or equal to zero,then actual earnings are zero:
y=Jyif y>O.
=10if
In the first stage described above, in which wedivide people into
lifetime income quintiles, our dependent variable waslog wages. Thus
we use generalized least-squaresestimation with individual fixed ef-
fects. In this second stage, the tobit model is nonlinear.We judged that
the additional programming effort to includefixed effects in our tobit
estimation was not worthwhile, given that such estimationalso implies
inconsistent parameter estimates (Heckman andMaCurdy 1980). By ex-
cluding fixed effects in this stage, we are able toinclude race, gender,
and education variables in the earnings regressionswithout interacting
them with age.
To simulate out-of-sample observations, wemultiply the independent
variables of each individual by the appropriatecoefficients from their
group's earnings regression. In addition, weinclude a random compo-
nent, which we obtain by using the estimatedstandard error of each
group's regression to generate a normally-distributedrandom variable.
This random component is intended to representunforeseen circum-
stances that affect earnings. It also meansthat individuals with the same
observed characteristics wifi not have the exact same earningsprofile.
Simulated earning observations are thus calculated as
9X/+E1
whereis the vector of estimated coefficients from our earnings regres-
sions, andis the random component obtained by usingthe standard
error of the regression to generate arandom variable. Using this proce-
dure, both positive and zero observations aregenerated. We found that
the number of zeros generated for each group isconsistent with the
number of zero observations observed for that groupduring the sample
years.
A.3 Derivation of Extended, Income-DifferentiatedMortality
To extend the mortality tables from age 85 through age99, we make three
assumptions. First, we assume that the probabilityof remaining alive
beyond age 85 decreases annually by a constant amount(Faber and Wade,
1983). Second, we set to zero the probability of remainingalive after age
99. This age seems a reasonable cutoff point, sinceless than 0.7 percent of182Coronado, Fullerton, & Glass
all social security beneficiaries are older than 95 (Annual StatisticalSupple-
ment, 1995). Third, given these two conditions, we find theconstant an-
nual change in the probability each year for eachsex-race group such that
the resulting set of probabilities yields the same life expectancyat age 85 as
in the Vital Statistics. The result was shown in Figure 2.
Table 7 in Rogot, Sorlie, Johnson, and Schmitt (1992) shows informa-
tion on actual deaths in their sample for each annual incomegroup,
within each race-sex-age group. For example, consider white males,
ages 25 to 34. For each range of income (e.g. $10,000 to $14,999 in 1980
dollars), their table shows the number of individuals in their sample(N
= 14,563), the number of observed deaths during the sample period (0
= 115), and the number of deaths that would be expected if all income
groups had the same mortality rate (E = 92.2). They then divide to get
the observed/expected ratio (O/E = 1.25). Actual deaths in that low-
income group are 25 percent higher than what would be expectedusing
tables not differentiated by income.
We know the annual income of every individual inour PSID sample,
so we need to exclude the "i.mknown income" category from the table in
Rogot, Sorlie, Johnson, and Schmitt (1992). Ifwe simply ignored this
category, the overall O/E ratio would not be 1.0 for all incomegroups
together. For this reason, we recalculate the expected deaths basedon
the subset of their individuals for which income is known, andrecalcu-
late O/E ratios for each group. The average of thesenew O/E ratios is 1.0,
as desired. We then apply the appropriate ratio to each cell. Results for
25-34-year olds are shown in Table 2.
Finally, since annual income is volatile,we do not want to apply these
annual-income-differentiated O/E ratios to the annual income of each
person each year. Instead, we base differential mortality on lifetime
income, in three steps. First, after we compute the presentvalue of
lifetime income for each of the 1,786 in our PSID sample,we assign each
individual a ranking compared to all individuals inour sample. For
example, an individual whose lifetime income ranks 432out of the 1,786
individuals is ranked in the 24th percentile. Second, for each ofthe
annual income groups in Table 2, we likewise determine percentilerank-
ings based on income (shown in the third column). Third, foreach
individual in our sample, we match the percentile of their lifetimein-
come to the percentile for the same age-race-sex category in Table 2. For
example, a white female aged 27 who has lifetime incomeat the 24th
percentile would be matched to the $10,000-14,999 annual-income
group (which lies between the 18th and the 36th percentile). That individ-
ual would then be assigned that group's O/E ratio for whitefemales
(1.17). Finally, this ratio is used to scale the probability of deathfor thatDistributional Impacts of Proposed Changes to SocialSecurity183
individual's age, sex, and race in the Vital Statistics(which are not differ-
entiated by income).
A remaining problem, however, isrelated to causality: our procedure
essentially uses the individual's income as adeterminant of death, even
though the aimual income levels in Table 2 maybe determined in part by
illness immediately preceding death.This problem is somewhat miti-
gated by the fact that the CPS data used byRogot, Sorlie, Johnson, and
Schmitt (1992) are based on total combinedfamily income, rather than
just the decedent's income.
A.4 Calculation of Social SecurityBenefits
Every variable in this appendix isspecific to each individual, but we
drop the index i for expositional simplicity.For an unmarried individual,
the social security benefit at age] is
BEN = PTA1 X CPI62,J/
where PTA is the primary insurance amount,and CPI62J is the cumulative
inflation index from age 62 to the age atwhich the benefit is computed.
Then the mortality-adjusted benefit is
E(BENJ) = BEN X
where E(BEN) is the expected value at age22 of the benefit to be
received at age], and P is the conditionalprobability of survival to age j,
given survival to age 22. For marriedindividuals, the basic benefit is
computed in the same manner. We computethe spousal benefit for the
wife (or analogously, the husband) as
SpBEN = 0.5 X SBENS,
where SpBEN is the spousal benefit atwife's age j, SBENJ5 is the hus-
band's PTA adjusted for inflation to age is,and j5 is the husband's age
when the wife is age j. Similarly, we calculatethe survivor benefit:
SurvBEN = SBENJ,
where SurvBEN is the wife's survivorbenefit after the death of the
husband. Tf the other spouse is alive, we assumethat a married individ-
ual receives the greater of his or her ownbenefit (BEN) and the spousal
benefit (SpBEN). If the other spouse isdeceased, the individual receives
the greater of his or her own benefit (BEN)and the survivor benefit184Coronado, Fullerton, & Glass
(SurvBEN). Using PB and PW for the husband'sand wife's survival
probabilities, the husband's mortality-adjusted benefitis
En(HBEN) = PF1[PW max(BEN, SpBEN)
+ (1 - PWJ) Max(BEN, SurvBEN)J,
where Eu(HBENJ) is the expected valueat age 22 of the husband's bene-
fit. This expected value includes only thedollars going directly to the
husband. A symmetrical calculation is madeto determine the wife's
mortality-adjusted benefit:
En(WBENj) = PW1 [PH max(BEN, SpBEn.)
+ (1 - PF1) max(BEN, SurvBEN)J.
We then compute the present value of expectedtaxes and benefits at







Finally, the internal rate of return is computed byfinding the discount
rate that equates these present values.
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